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How Will Türkiye Respond To War In Lebanon (And Renewed Destabilization Of Syria)?

Tyler Durden's Photo
by Tyler Durden
Authored...

Authored by Conor Gallagher via NakedCapitalism.com,

As Israel — with US support — continues its rampage across the Middle East, Türkiye is assessing the shifting landscape and weighing costs and opportunities, including economic and security concerns, ties with NATO on one hand and BRICS countries on the other, and its own regional aspirations.

Turkish Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmus emphasized the country’s position over the weekend, saying that Türkiye follows its own “national axis” in foreign policy and rejects the idea that it must align with any power or bloc. Where is that “national axis” going to take the country as the Middle East goes up in flames and Türkiye is positioned to play a key role?

One route it appears certain not to take is concrete position to Israel. Despite all Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s rhetoric against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and company, goods from Türkiye continue to make their way to Israel. Oil continues to flow through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline from Azerbaijan to Türkiye’s Ceyhan port where it is shipped to Haifa — constituting roughly 40 percent of Israel’s supply.

In early May, Türkiye said it was halting exports to Israel due to the “worsening humanitarian tragedy” in the Palestinian territories. Yet goods, including critical minerals and chemicals used by the Israeli military get around the export ban by simply going through third countries, such as Greece. And the US is still using Incirlik Air Base in southern Türkiye to assist Israel.

This is unsurprising as In some ways the US/Israel current rampage through the Middle East fits with Turkish goals. Here are six issues confronting the Turkish government as it decides how to proceed:

1. There are suggestions that the US and Israel are after regime change in Lebanon. 

Here’s the executive director of the influential neocon Washington Institute for Near East Policy:

But this is also a moment for the Biden administration to shift focus from its Sisyphean pursuit of a Gaza cease-fire to taking advantage of the opportunities presented by Israel’s seismic shock to Hezbollah.

With assertive, engaged diplomacy, the Biden administration can help engineer a new security regime that allows civilians to return to their homes along the Israel-Lebanon border and work with local and international partners to help build a new political architecture for Lebanon.

This isn’t the Saudi-Israel peace and normalization accord that the Biden administration hoped to leave as a legacy — though there might be one last bite at this apple during the presidential transition — nor even the Gaza cease-fire for which the White House has labored for months. But after a year of tragedy and sadness, this would be real progress. At the same time, it is essential for Washington to warn Tehran about the high price it will suffer if it decides to make a dash for a nuclear-weapons capability. By building on Israel’s killing of Nasrallah, President Biden has the opportunity to leave the Middle East better today than it was on Oct. 8, which is no small achievement.

Türkiye would support such a goal as it is no fan of Hezbollah, and any weakening of the latter’s influence in Syria, could allow Türkiye to increase its footprint.

“If it translates into a longer-term weakening of Iran and allied Shiite groups, including Hezbollah, that will really pave the way for Türkiye to play a more dominant role” in Syria and Iraq, said Gönül Tol, Türkiye director for the Middle East Institute, a research center in Washington.

During the Syrian Civil War, Türkiye and Hezbollah fought on opposing sides. Hezbollah supports the Assad government, while Türkiye supported Syrian opposition groups like the Free Syrian Army seeking to overthrow Assad — although it now focuses primarily on fighting (US-backed) Kurdish groups in Syria and has sought to improve ties with Assad at the behest of Moscow and Tehran. Progress has been slow, however.

While the Turkish government offers statements of support for the Lebanese people, pro-government media in Türkiye lambast Hezbollah:

On a program aired by A Haber, retired Colonel and security pundit Coşkun Başbuğ claimed that Nasrallah was working for Mossad and that Hezbollah’s leadership was “sold out.” Başbuğ argued that Hezbollah could have turned the Israeli border into a “hell” but did not due to its compromised leadership. Başbuğ stated that Nasrallah and other Hezbollah leaders were discarded by those who used them. Additionally, he referred to Hezbollah’s missile attacks as mere “firework displays.”

Yeni Şafak columnist and a former Justice and Development Party (AKP) MP Aydın Ünal said the assassination of Nasrallah was met with joy and excitement by the oppressed Syrians. Ünal said that Nasrallah, following orders from Iran, had brutally and mercilessly carried out massacres of Muslims.

There are now growing calls in Türkiye for the country to abandon its more conciliatory approach of the past few years and return to one of trying to expand its influence by whatever means necessary. Those efforts mostly ended in disaster and left Türkiye more isolated, but memories are short when opportunity comes calling. Dr. Samir Salha, the founding dean of the Law Faculty at Gaziantep University in Türkiye and a professor of law and international relations there, argues that “the region’s escalating violence contradicts Ankara’s strategy of resolving disputes with neighboring countries.”

Not sure how that makes sense, but it is representative of a popular rationale among the more interventionist faction of the Turkish elite.

There are now reports (although not the most reliable) that Ankara is planning “limited” ground operations in Northwestern Syria. To what end is unclear. Türkiye’s military presence in Idlib is now mostly observation posts, support for the area’s Sunni Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and an entente with Russia. Any operation would likely be to close off borders or reinforce HTS — although the latter option could bring Türkiye into direct conflict with Russia.

The Erdogan government, however, is facing increasing calls to do something because of our next point.

2. Syrian and Now Lebanese Refugee Crisis.

Türkiye is already struggling with inflation and economic stagnation, and it could face additional economic shocks if the conflicts intensify disrupting energy supplies and trade routes.

Türkiye is also currently hosting millions of Syrian refugees. Many more are likely to be on the way soon.

Since Israel began its destruction of Lebanon in earnest, roughly 220,000 people have fled into Syria (many are Syrians who had left during the country’s conflicts). That number is expected to grow considerably should the bombing campaign continue and many will attempt to make their way to Türkiye.

The refugee situation along with the economy were the two biggest issues in the presidential and parliamentary elections last year — a vote Erdogan barely survived. Nationalists arguing for the expulsion of Syrian refugees were some of the biggest winners. A major influx of new refugees is going to be problematic for the Erdogan government, and he faces pressure to secure the country’s borders, particularly given the economic situation.

3. Conflict Spillover into Syria.

The Syrian War never officially ended. It’s just slowed to a simmer, but that looks to be changing. Israeli airstrikes in Syria, refugees from Lebanon, and Iran and Hezbollah’s focus on Israel, could all contribute to the destabilization of the fragile ceasefires in various parts of country. Here’s current lay of land:

Israel has carried out regular airstrikes on Syria in recent years, but they are now ratcheting up in frequency and severity — including two this week alone on Damascus.

Now the US/Israel is saying they’re trying to stop the flow of weapons from Iran through Syria to Lebanon.

Then they bombed the alleged smuggling tunnel. The damage now means refugees now must largely trek into Syria on foot.

According to some reports, Hezbollah has withdrawn many of its fighters from Syria in order to join the conflict in Lebanon. A reduced Iranian and Hezbollah presence potentially opens the door for Sunni extremist groups in the region, which Türkiye and the US often support in an effort to bring down Assad.

4. ISIS Being Prepped for a Comeback Tour?

Here’s the Middle East Institute on the group’s resurgence:

In an unusual public statement late on July 16, United States Armed Forces’ Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that after six months of 2024, “ISIS is on pace to more than double” the number of attacks in Syria and Iraq it claimed in 2023. According to CENTCOM, ISIS has so far conducted 153 attacks across both countries from January through June, noting that “the increase in attacks indicates ISIS is attempting to reconstitute following several years of decreased capability.” CENTCOM’s commander, Gen. Michael E. Kurilla, insisted that achieving an enduring defeat of ISIS still relies on the “combined efforts of the Coalition and partners”

5. Multiple US Proxies Versus Russia in Syria?

Among recent Israeli airstrikes in Syria was likely one that targeted an ammunition warehouse near the largest Russian air base in Syria.

Russia successfully protected Syria during the Western-instigated “civil war” led by its jihadist fanatics. Are we about to get another round with additional players? The US’s favorite neo-Nazis from Ukraine mixing it up with Turkish-backed Islamisists with support from the genocidal Israel Defense Forces ? What could go wrong?

Here’s where things get interesting regarding Türkiye. Moscow is alleging that Kiev and Washington are training militants from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS – the group in Idlib along Türkiye’s border with Turkish support). Here’s Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov last week:

“Vladimir Zelensky’s regime, in coordination with the Americans, is training terrorists from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Syria, using new UAV production technologies for combat operations against Russian forces in the republic.”

A September 9 report in the Turkish newspaper Aydinlik backs up Lavrov’s claim. It reported that Ukraine is offering drones and training in return for individuals in HTS prisons to fight Russia. Earlier in September Ukrainian special forces allegedly launched an attack on a Russian military facility on the outskirts of Aleppo. From Military Watch:

 According to Western sources, the attack saw powerful explosion followed by secondary detonations causing serious damage to the site. Aleppo has long been on the frontier of attacks from jihadist groups due to its close proximity to the Turkish border, with Türkiye being the primary state sponsor of Islamist anti government militants in the country and placing the Syrian governate of Idlib, currently run by the Al Qaeda affiliated Al Nusra Front, under its protection. Ukraine has escalated efforts to provide armaments and training to Islamist groups targeting Russian forces, and alongside Türkiye has for several months deployed special forces to northwestern Syria specifically to support militant groups based there.

Moscow is also now warning that the US and UK are planning to use Ukraine to unleash a chemical weapons false flag provocation in Syria — although this could also be being released by Russia in order to justify coming operations in Northwestern Syria to root out Ukrainian and HTS operations there.

What role will Türkiye play?

6. The US and the Kurds

In many areas, Türkiye and Russia have been increasingly cooperating in Syria while Türkiye and the US frequently come close to direct conflict. Importantly, Turkish and Iranian interests have also aligned:

Iranian and Turkish interests seem to be increasingly aligning, particularly in their united front against Israel’s actions toward Hamas and in opposing the resurgence of a U.S.-led regional order. However, their historical competition for strategic dominance in areas like Iraq and Syria, coupled with the distinct forms of revisionism that the AKP and Iranian leadership champion on the global stage, suggests that any emerging alliance between them might remain tenuous and susceptible to strains in the mid to long term.

The question is if Türkiye’s calculus changes due to the potential weakening of Hezbollah and Iranian positions in Syria. There exists the possibility that Türkiye might trade its support for Islamists in Northwestern Syria for a green light from Russia to go on the offensive against Kurds in Northeastern Syria, but we’ll see.

Elsewhere Turkish ties with both Russia and China have been steadily improving, which is helping Erdogan slowly rebuild the Turkish economy. Would he potentially throw away that progress on another chance to increase Turkish influence in Syria? At the same time, Turkiye’s economic ties with the West — primarily the EU of which it is a member of the customs union —  still dwarf those of Russia and China. And we know loads of economic pressure is constantly on Ankara to toe the NATO line, as evidenced by the increasing number of US sanctions on Turkish entities.

One last consideration for Ankara is the prospect of an increasingly powerful Russian-Iranian presence surrounding Türkiye should the US/Israel be soundly defeated in the current conflicts and the Americans booted from many of their Middle East outposts.

While Türkiye is wholeheartedly opposed to US support for Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria, it has also long tried to balance Russia and the US off one another in the region. Either one with an overwhelming advantage is cause for concern in Ankara, which might help explain the recent talk of Türkiye potentially handing over its Russian S-400s to the US and assisting US/Israel efforts in the region.

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